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This research focuses on a mathematical model for Fixed-
Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) type contracts. The model
revolves around the concept of a balanced trade-off among
different options available to the user. At one extreme, the
model develops a FPIF arrangement that gives the contractor a
strong incentive to underrun costs, but strict penalties if
he overruns. At the other extreme, the model develops a FPIF
arrangement that gives the contractor minimal incentive to
underrun, yet significant protection against an overrun. The
mathematics of the model uses integral calculus to balance
each of the options such that both the expected profit for
the contractor and the expected cost to the Government do not
change as the user selects different options . In this
computation, the subjective probability density function for
the cost is assumed to remain constant . This process
attempts to accommodate the contractor based on his composite
attitude toward risk and utility, yet does not obstruct the




A. MOTIVATION THEORY AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTING 2
B. OBJECTIVE 6
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 8




II. UNDERSTANDING FIXED-PRICE- INCENTIVE-FIRM CONTRACTS ... 11
A. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 17
B. FIXED-PRICE-INCENTIVE-FIRM ANALYSIS 20
III. DEVELOPING THE MODEL: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 2 4
A. THE STUDENTS' APPROACH 25
B. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL'S APPROACH 28
C. THE MODEL'S APPROACH TOWARD A SOLE SOURCE 37
IV. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL: A DETAILED ANALYSIS 3 9
A. CALCULATING THE TARGET COST 3 9
B. CALCULATING THE TARGET PROFIT 43
C. THE SHARE RATIO AND POINT OF TOTAL ASSUMPTION .... 48
D. CALCULATING THE OPTION COEFFICIENTS 52
E. ANALYZING THE EXPECTED PROFIT AND GOVERNMENT COST . . 56
F. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTRACTOR'S UTILITY FUNCTION ... 63
G. USING STATISTICS 69
H. ANALYZING SOLE SOURCE CASES 7 3
I. SUMMARY 7 5
V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH ... 76
A. CONCLUSION 7 6
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 7 7
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 7 9
LIST OF REFERENCES 83
APPENDIX A (FIXED-PRICE-INCENTIVE-FIRM COMPUTER PROGRAM) . . 85
APPENDIX B (ELECTRONIC TESTING CORPORATION CASE STUDY) . . 115
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 120
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my gratitude for two people who
significantly contributed to this thesis. First, I thank
my wife, Pearl, for her infinite patience. Second, I thank





Since the dawn of civilization, man, in his never ending
quest to further his personal objectives, has learned to
contract with his fellow citizens. Contracting encompassed
all of man's endeavors. From the bartering in the
marketplace to the agreements among kings, man quickly
learned the principles of contracting and the art of
negotiations. As society changed, contracting also changed.
Through the centuries, as civilization evolved from serfdom
monarchs into capitalistic democracies, contracting,
likewise, grew in magnitude and complexity. One major
development in contracting ' s evolution was the use of
incentives. Basic contracting, the process through which two
independent parties freely enter into an agreement, lacked
the ability for one party to motivate the other. Incentive
contracting, designed to fill this void, allowed one party to
motivate behavior or "incentivize" the other party to perform
in a specific way. With rewards and/or punishments, one
party could "motivate" the other party to perform according
to his own objectives. The better the performing party did,
the higher she would be rewarded. Incentives encouraged
creative approaches to contracting, opened communications
between both parties, and forced each party to consider the
perspective of the opposite side.
A . MOTIVATION THEORY AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTING
Incentive contracting revolves around motivation theory.
Although there are many renown motivational theories, two of
the best recognized are Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory
and Herzberg's Two-Factor theory. [Ref. 8:p. 14] Although
neither of these theories addresses incentive contracting
directly, both are important to understand what motivates man-
-the fundamental objective of an incentive contract.
Maslow's theory states that man is motivated by his
hierarchy of needs. The most basic of man's needs are food,
clothing, shelter, and safety--a reflection of man's
environment. Next are more abstract needs such as self-
esteem, acceptance, cognitive development, and challenge--a
reflection of man's peers. Finally, at the top of the
hierarchy are internal concepts such as aesthetic needs,
beauty, symmetry, and eventually self-actualization—
a
reflection of man's self. Maslow believed that as man meets
his basic needs, he strives to conquer his advanced needs
until he reaches "self-actualization" or self-fulfillment.
[Ref. 12:pp. 309-311]
Herzberg's Two-Factor theory divides motivation into two
categories: hygiene and satisfier. Hygiene factors only
affect job dissatisfaction. Typical examples of hygiene
factors are working conditions, interpersonal relations,
quality of supervision, and salary. Consider the following
example regarding working conditions. A worker may be
unhappy because her office is too noisy. The next day, if
the manager reduces the noise level, that worker will not
necessarily be satisfied with her job. She will only cease
being unhappy. In other words, hygiene factors do not bring
job satisfaction. At best hygiene factors can only prevent
job dissatisfaction. The second category, satisfiers, on the
other hand, can bring job satisfaction. These typically
include the more abstract: achievement, recognition,
responsibility, advancement, and growth. Herzberg's theory
contends that these two categories (hygiene and satisfiers)
are mutually exclusive. That is although satisfiers can
bring job satisfaction, they cannot prevent job
dissatisfaction. Essentially, the two factors are separate
dimensions. [Ref. 13:pp. 57-63]
Although neither Maslow or Herzberg's theories focus on
incentive contracts, both concepts are important to
understanding human nature. When developing an incentive
contract with a company, one must know what will motivate
that company. Is the company driven by higher profits?
Perhaps the company is content with its financial position
and only seeks challenging work or scientific recognition.
Maybe the company is risk averse and wants protection against
expensive overruns. Only by understanding the contractor's
objective can a buyer develop an incentive arrangement that
will effectively motivate the contractor. Take for example,
the Wright Brothers' airplane incentive contract.
In 1907 the Wright Brothers had an incentive contract
that agreed to pay more for a faster aircraft and less for a
slower aircraft . The base price for the contract was
$25,000. The expected speed of the aircraft was 40 miles per
hour. The contract promised to pay the Wright Brothers
according to Table 1.1:
TABLE 1.1 WRIGHT BROTHERS' CONTRACT
less than 36 mph rejected
36 mph 60% of base price
37 mph 70% of base price
38 mph 80% of base price
39 mph 90% of base price
40 mph 100% of base price
41 mph 110% of base price
42 mph 120% of base price
43 mph 130% of base price
44 mph 140% of base price
In this contract the buydr sought a faster aircraft. The
buyer wanted to motivate the Wright Brothers through higher
profits. The Wright Brothers, like most people, preferred to
earn higher profits (to build a faster aircraft) yet were
still limited by physical constraints, technology, and
capital investment. In this example the Wright Brothers
built an airplane that flew 42.5 mph, earning them an
additional bonus of $6,250. [Ref. ll:pp. 3-4] However, only
the Wright Brothers will ever know if the incentive
arrangement provided the primary motivation for their work.
Perhaps, the Wright Brothers wanted fame more than the
additional profits. If so, the incentive arrangement was not
as effective as it could have been. If the Wright Brothers
wanted fame, maybe if the buyer promised media exposure
instead of higher profits, the plane might have flown 45 mph!
The point of this example is to emphasize the paramount
importance of understanding what motivates a contractor. Of
course all contractors are limited by physical constraints,
technology, capital, and human resources. Yet even within
these boundaries, both parties benefit when a contractor is
motivated through incentives to perform better than expected.
Only with the knowledge of what will motivate a contractor
can one develop an effective incentive contract.
Today, given the complexity of man's technological
endeavors, incentive contracts have evolved into many
partitions. These contract types include: Cost-Plus-
Incentive-Fee, Cost-Plus-Award-Fee, Fixed-Price-Award-Fee,
Fixed-Price-Incentive-Successive-Targets, and Fixed-Price-
Incentive-Firm. For each of these contracts, there is a
unique approach to "motivating" the contractor's behavior.
Some of these contract types attempt to motivate the
contractor to control costs by paying them higher profits for
lower costs. Others focus on performance. The better the
contractor does on predetermined performance tests (such as
speed in the Wright Brothers' contract) the more profit the
contractor earns.
B . OBJECTIVE
This thesis focuses on the Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm
(FPIF) arrangement and attempts to develop a decision support
system for this contract type. In the last few decades, the
acquisition and technological environments have changed
significantly. In the contracting community, acquisition
planning has become more complex and entangled in legal
ramifications. In the technological community, powerful
desktop computers are as common as calculators were twenty
years ago. Today, computers are an integrated tool for all
businesses throughout the world. More than just data
processors, computers serve as data bases, expert systems,
artificial intelligence, and decision support systems. They
help people make decisions. [Ref. 5:pp. 1-37] In the
business community, computers assist decision-makers to
analyze data. In the medical field, advanced computers work
with doctors to diagnosis patients. In the entertainment
field, computers generate detailed graphics for movies. In
the artificial intelligence arena, computers play chess at
the grandmaster level and are beginning their siege on the
world champion. [Ref. 6:p. 52] The fact is very clear:
computers are an integrated part of man's decision-making
process
.
This thesis attempts to merge these changing communities
by developing a mathematical model for FPIF contracts and
implementing this model into a Pascal computer decision
support system. (See Appendix A: Computer Program) To
develop a model, the researcher first studied the human
thought process, then modified these processes, making them
applicable to a mathematical model. The model prompts the
user for specific information regarding a FPIF arrangement,
then based on the data, presents a potential FPIF pricing
arrangement. The inputs required are the answers to specific
questions regarding the contract . The output is the
potential FPIF arrangement in tabular form including all
basic characteristics of the pricing structure. Like all
computer models, the output will only be as good as the
input. Ultimately, the researcher hopes that this model will
(1) exercise sound business judgment; (2) lay the foundation
for contracting software; (3) become a valuable contracting
tool for acquisition personnel; and (4) help contracting
personnel understand the fundamentals of FPIF contracts.
C.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary focus of this thesis is to develop a
mathematical model for FPIF contracts and implement this
model in a computer program. The specific research question
is can a mathematical model be developed to assist
contracting personnel analyze alternative pricing strategies
for FPIF type contracts? The subsidiary questions are:
1. What inputs would the computer require to develop
effective pricing arrangements for FPIF contracts?
2. How can the model assist contracting personnel by
providing a means to ask "what if" questions that otherwise
would have been too time consuming and calculation intensive?
3. In what way can the model effectively capture a
"business strategy", making it an effective and reliable
asset to decision-makers?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The primary focus of this thesis is directed toward the
mathematical model. The researcher's goal is to develop a
mathematical model that systematically approaches a FPIF
contract. Key calculations in the model are profit of the
contractor, expected cost to the Government, and expected
utility of the contractor. The secondary emphasis of the
thesis is the computer program. Unfortunately, mathematical
models often remain on the shelves of academic institutions.
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The researcher hopes to implement a framework of the
mathematical model into a simplified computer program. The
computer program only performs the most basic functions of
the model. The objective is not to design commercial quality
software, but to create a basic tool that can transport the
model from academia onto the desks of contracting personnel.
In developing the model, one fundamental assumption made
throughout most of this thesis is a uniform cost distribution
function within +/- 3 standard deviations from the mean. A
uniform cost distribution implies that all costs within +/- 3
standard deviations have a equal probability of being the
actual costs. In reality, cost functions tend to be normally
distributed. The researcher makes this assumption in order
to simplify the mathematics . Without this assumption, the
integration would be complex. However, given that both
distribution functions are symmetric about the mean, the
overall mathematical effects of this assumption should not be
significant. Furthermore, the emphasis of the model is on




The researcher began by studying the human thought
process for developing FPIF arrangements. After writing a
case study regarding a FPIF contract, the researcher
presented the case to students in the Pricing and
Negotiations Course at the Naval Postgraduate School. After
analyzing the students' processes, the researcher developed a
mathematical model that mimics the human thought processes,
yet taps the resources available to a computer. The
mathematics of the model focus on the expected profit of the
contractor, the expected cost to the Government, and the
expected utility of the contractor.
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II. UNDERSTANDING FIXED-PRICE- INCENTIVE-FIRM CONTRACTS
Before one can fully appreciate a Fixed-Price-Incent ive-
Firm contract, one must understand the wider spectrum of
contract types. There are two basic types of contracts:
cost-reimbursable and fixed-price. [Ref. l:p. 1-11]
Cost-reimbursement is best suited for contracts with
relatively high uncertainty as to the cost, performance, and
schedule of completing the contract. [Ref. l:p. 1-11] For
cost-reimbursable contracts, the buyer agrees to pay the
seller all allowable costs. In return, the seller guarantees
best efforts to meet the terms and conditions of the
contract. Essentially, since the buyer agrees to pay for all
costs, he bears the burden of risk. [Ref. l:p. 1-11]
The second basic contract type is fixed-price.
Fixed-price arrangements are best suited for contracts with
high certainty as to the expected cost, performance, and
schedule of completing the contract. [Ref. l:p. 1-11] For
this type of contract the seller agrees to deliver the goods
and/or services according to the terms and conditions of the
contract regardless of the actual costs. [Ref. l:p. 1-11]
Since the seller, regardless of unforeseen delays or
complications, must deliver the goods or services, the
11
seller bears the burden of risk. [Ref. l:p. 1-11]
Stanley Sherman, professor at The George Washington
University, explains the differences between the two contract
types as :
The difference is expressed best in terms of the assumption
of risks of the two parties. In the cost contract, the
buyer assumes most of the financial risks of nonperformance
or delayed performance. In the fixed-price contract, the
supplier assumes most of the financial risk of
nonperformance or delayed performance. [Ref. 14 :p. 319]
However, since all contracts do not definitively fall into
one of these two broad categories (the substantial gray area
between certainty and uncertainty) there is a subset category
between cost and fixed-price type contracts known as
incentive contracts. Incentive contracts include: Cost-Plus-
Incentive-Fee (CPIF) , Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) , Fixed-Price-
Award-Fee (FPAF) , Fixed-Price-Incentive-Successive-Targets
(FPIS) , and, the subject of this thesis, Fixed-Price-
Incentive-Firm (FPIF) . Essentially, incentive contracts
attempt to balance the risk between buyer and seller and
motivate the contractor to perform. [Ref. 3:p. 5-32]
Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) arrangements are best
suited for contracts with substantial risk, but not enough to
warrant a cost-type contract. Historically, FPIF contracts
have been used for development contracts, low rate initial
production contracts, and production contracts with
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substantial uncertainty. [Ref. 7:pp. 1-2] As a general
rule, FPIF contracts should be used when the difference
between the highest and lowest cost proposal (in the
competitive range) varies between 10% and 15%. [Ref. 3:p. 5-
32] If the proposals vary less than 10%, the buyer might
consider moving toward a Firm Fixed-Price contract.
Likewise, if the proposals vary more than 15%, the buyer,
given the higher uncertainty, might consider moving toward a
cost-type contract. Although these parameters serve as an
excellent guideline, these percentages should not be the sole
reason for selecting a contract type.
In a FPIF contract, the buyer and seller share the cost
risk within a predetermined range through a share ratio. At
the upper limit of the range, the seller assumes all
financial responsibility. Above the point of total
assumption (PTA) , for every dollar the seller overruns, the
contractor loses a dollar of profit. If the overrun is so
great such that all profit is exhausted, (ceiling price) the
contractor not only loses all profit but incurs a loss
.
Figure 2.1 graphs a hypothetical contract (contractor's
profit versus her actual costs) . Most FPIF pricing
arrangement can be characterized with six points: target
cost, target profit, target price, share ratio, point of
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total assumption and ceiling price. For the example shown in
Figure 2.1, these six points are:
Target Cost: $200,000
Target Profit: $ 20,000
Target Price: $220,000
Share Ratio (Gov/Cont ractor )
:
50/50
Point of Total Assumption: $210,000
Ceiling Price: $225,000
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Source: Developed by researcher FIGURE 2.1
More complicated FPIF arrangements may have more than one
share ratio, but for simplicity reasons, this paper
concentrates on the basic FPIF contract shown in Figure 2.1.
In this example, both parties share the costs if actual costs
are below PTA ($210,000). If the seller underruns (costs
below target costs) the seller earns a profit greater than
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the target profit. For example, at an actual cost of
$180,000 the contractor would earn a profit of $30,000, which
is more than the $20,000 target profit. If the seller
overruns, his profits slowly diminish, but the buyer also
bears his portion of these costs until the point of total
assumption. Above PTA the seller bears all additional costs
but still earns some profit until he reaches ceiling price.
Once above the ceiling price, the seller loses not only
profit but other earnings. For example, in Figure 2.1, if
the actual cost is $240,000, the buyer would only pay the
$225,000 ceiling price. The seller would lose $15,000 on
this contract and earn no profit
.
For any FPIF arrangement, the seller would like to
negotiate an arrangement, that when graphed like Figure 2.1,
is as high and far right as possible. If the seller can
negotiate a FPIF that when graphed is higher and farther to
the right, the seller will increase his profits regardless of
the actual costs and further protect himself from an
expensive overrun. FPIF contracts with a relatively high
cost uncertainty (15% cost variance among competitive
proposals) tend to be negotiated in this direction.
The buyer, on the other hand, wants to negotiate an
arrangement, that when graphed, would be as low and far left
as possible (but not too far that he increases the chances of
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the seller defaulting) . A FPIF arrangement that when graphed
is lower and farther left would limit the costs of the buyer
regardless of actual costs. FPIF contracts with relatively
low cost uncertainty (10% cost variance) tend to be
negotiated in this direction. Within these two objectives is
a fair and reasonable FPIF pricing arrangement.
Although there is no simple strategy for developing a
FPIF pricing structure, by understanding the incentive
arrangement, acquisition planners can make better use of FPIF
contracts. A FPIF arrangement can be a means to balance risk
between the inherent cost uncertainty, the contractor's
incentive to underrun, and the contractor's protection
against an overrun. In a FPIF arrangement, the buyer rewards
the seller with more profit if the seller is able to control
costs (the lower the actual costs upon completion, the higher
the contractor's profit) . With this information, one might
conclude that a FPIF contract is an effective incentive
arrangement when the seller is motivated by higher profits
and the buyer's objective is to control costs. To reach this
conclusion, however, is ignore half of the FPIF arrangement
.
The other half focuses on cost overruns. A FPIF arrangement
also gives the seller limited protection against a cost
overrun. Therefore, a FPIF contract would also be an
effective incentive arrangement for the risk averse
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contractor who does not seek to maximize his profits but
rather wants protection against a costly overrun. In the
event of an overrun, the buyer carries his share of the
overrun, and may end up paying more than he would have paid
with a Firm Fixed-Price contract. Therefore, considering
both the under and overrun elements, a FPIF contract is an
effective incentive arrangement when both parties want to
manage and share the inherent cost risk.
A . ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
There are three major advantages to a FPIF arrangement.
The first advantage is its flexibility in allocating risk
between the two contractual parties. Given the inherent
uncertainty, the seller is motivated to control cost to earn
a higher profit, yet is also protected against limited cost
overruns. Essentially, a FPIF arrangement permits both the
buyer and seller to share this risk. A higher/lower
contractor share ratio puts more/less risk on the contractor.
With a FPIF contract, the two parties can negotiate an
appropriate share ratio to balance the risk between both
parties. Contrarily, with a cost-type contract, the buyer
bears the risk. With a fixed-price type contract, the seller
carries the burden. [Ref. 14 :p. 319]
The second advantage of a FPIF arrangement is that it
fosters communication between both parties. In addition to
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negotiating just one price, both parties must agree on a
target cost, target profit, ceiling price, and share ratio.
These additional requirements encourage both parties to
communicate their strengths, weaknesses, and concerns.
Through this communication each party can appreciate the
concerns of the other party, and work together to ensure a
successful contract. [Ref. 3:p. 5-32]
Finally, FPIF contracts increase cost awareness and
visibility. Since the contractor's final profit is based on
her final cost, the contractor is required to keep
accountable records. These records will be used to help both
parties negotiate a final actual cost which will be used to
determine the contractor's final profit. These records help
both the seller and buyer with cost control, cost management,
and contract administration. [Ref. 3:p. 5-32] Furthermore,
these records can also help both the buyer and seller price
future contracts.
FPIF contracts, however, are not without their
disadvantages. Two major disadvantages of a FPIF type
pricing arrangement are the increased bureaucracy in
administering a FPIF contract and potential complications
from contract changes. [Ref. 3:p. 5-32] A FPIF contract,
given the cost visibility, is much more difficult and
expensive to administer than a Firm Fixed-Price (FFP)
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contract. Since the Government has no visibility of the
actual contract costs with FFP contracts, neither the
Government nor contractor needs to keep detailed records.
[Ref. 3:p. 5-32] However, with a FPIF contract, both parties
must dedicate personnel to ensure an accurate record and
analysis of the contract costs. This increases the cost of
overhead and, eventually, the final contract price. [Ref.
3:p. 5-32]
A second major disadvantage of a FPIF type contract is
negotiating contract changes. [Ref. 3:p. 5-32] Contract
changes may require extensive adjustments to existing
sensitive pricing agreements. If the Government directs the
contractor to make changes in the contract, it is often
difficult to equitably quantify the changes into a new
pricing structure. Obviously, changes affect the contract
and may affect the target cost, target profit, share ratio,
PTA, or ceiling price. Both parties must negotiate these
changes which can be difficult especially for a terminated
contract or a contract in a declining budget environment
.
These difficulties can lead to a negotiation impasse, adverse
relationship, or legal dispute. [Ref. 3:p. 5-32] Regardless
of these disadvantages, if used correctly, FPIF contracts are
a valuable asset for a contracting officer to balance risk
and manage contract performance
.
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B . FIXED-PRICE-INCENTIVE-FIRM ANALYSIS
One common misconception regarding the FPIF contract is
that its primary purpose is to motivate ( incentivize) the
contractor to control costs. True, a FPIF arrangement
encourages the contractor to underrun costs, but not as much
as a Firm Fixed-Price (FFP) . With a FFP contract, for every
underrun dollar, the contractor earns a full additional
dollar of profit, and does not have to share the savings with
the buyer. With a FPIF contract, the contractor would have
to share this savings with the Government. To motivate a
seller to underrun costs, basic incentive theory contends
that the higher the contractor share ratio, the greater the
contractor's motivation to underrun costs. In November 1987,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report on Fixed-
Price-Incentive contracts. Regarding contractor motivation,
they wrote
:
If the contracts act according to incentive theory, we
would expect to find ... an increasing tendency for final
prices to underrun the target price (or for overruns to
be minimized) as the contractor share ratios increase.
[Ref. 7:p. 2]
To test their hypothesis, GAO audited 537 FPI contracts
awarded between 1977-1984. GAO compared the actual costs of
the contracts (as a percentage of target costs) against the
negotiated share ratio. The agency expected to find that the
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higher the contractor share ratio, the greater the tendency
for the actual cost to be lower as a percentage of target
costs. In other words, assuming a contractor wanted to
maximize her profit, she would work harder to control costs
for contracts with a higher share ratio. However, the GAO
study found no such correlation; and, GAO erroneously
concluded that a higher contractor share ratio has no effect
on actual costs. 1 Despite its apparent failure to motivate
the contractor in full accordance with incentive theory, GAO
acknowledged the value of FPI pricing arrangements. The
report concluded:
Although the FPI contracts we reviewed did not behave
exactly as the theory predicted, they offer the Government
the advantages of being able to limit its financial
liability and to share risks with contractors. [Ref.7:p. 4]
These results are often interpreted to mean that a FPIF
contract is not a motivator for contractors to control costs,
1. Since the contractor has significant input into the
negotiated parameters of-the contract, GAO ' s conclusion is
fallacious. A company will negotiate a share ratio, target
cost, and other parameters based on the contract's cost
uncertainties and the degree of risk the company is willing
to accept. In other words, the company that agrees to the
higher contractor share ratio has already factored in his
risks and cost uncertainties. One way GAO ' s conclusion would
be valid is if all the FPIF arrangements randomly assigned
share ratios with no contractor input. Then, under these
conditions, and only under these conditions, should the GAO
expect to find an "increasing tendency for final prices to
underrun the target price (or for overruns to be minimized)
as contractor share ratios increase."
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but a means for the buyer and seller to balance the cost
uncertainty. As discussed in the footnote, this conclusion
in incomplete. However, to develop the model, the researcher
assumed that GAO ' s conclusion is accurate within certain
parameters. To explain this concept from GAO ' s perspective,
let us revisit the hypothetical contract in Figure 2.1.
After reviewing the request for proposal, the contractor will
formulate a table or graph representing the probability of
cost distribution. If not a formal report, this will be a
subjective analysis by top management. One possible
presentation of the data is shown in Figure 2.2.
Probiability
0.97
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Source: Developed by researcher FIGURE 2.2
Given this cost uncertainty, a FFP contract would be too
risky for the contractor, unless she charged a premium price
22
Similarly, the cost uncertainty is not so great that it
warrants a cost-type contract. A logical alternative is a
FPIF arrangement. Figure 2.2 diagrams the contractor's
estimated probabilities of what it will cost to complete this
contract. In this example, the contractor estimates that
there is a 0.50 probability that she can complete this
contract for $200,000 or less. Each of these probability
costs are based on the contractor doing her "best efforts"
and have little apparent relation to the contractor's
negotiated share ratio. However, in developing this
probability cost estimation, the contractor has already
factored in an expected share ratio. As long as the
negotiated share ratio is near what she expected, her
estimated probability of cost distribution (Figure 2.2) will
remain the same . However, if there is a significant change
in the share ratio, her probability of cost distribution will
also change. The researcher's model allows for moderate
changes in the share ratio. The researcher assumes that
within these moderate changes, the contractor's cost
probability will remain relatively constant. This is
particularly true if the negotiated share ratio is stable and
predictable for the industry.
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III. DEVELOPING THE MODEL: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
To develop a mathematical model for FPIF contracts, the
researcher began by studying the human thought process.
After writing a case study (Electronic Testing Corporation
Case: Appendix B) the researcher presented the study to the
Pricing and Negotiations class at the Naval Postgraduate
School. A total of 16 students participated. Working in
pairs, students were asked (1) to read the case; (2) to
develop a FPIF pricing arrangement including target cost,
target profit, share ratio, point of total assumption, and
ceiling price; and (3) to describe how they approached the
issues and reached their conclusions. Hoping to
mathematically mimic a business strategy, the researcher was
more interested in the students' thought process than the
actual results.
The case study describes a hypothetical company in the
electronic testing industry. In the case, Electronic Testing
Corporation (ETC) is planning to use a FPIF contract to buy
new test equipment. The company solicits quotations from
various contractors. Eight companies submit quotations. ETC
contracting personnel analyze these quotations and assess the
reliability of each proposal based on the cost data and past
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performance of the contractor. Naturally, some quotations
are more reliable than others. ETC also initiates an
independent cost estimate. The case portrays the electronic
testing business environment, the central issues, the primary
concerns of both parties, and historical data on past
contracts .
This chapter analyzes the students' approaches in the
Electronic Testing Corporation case study and compares their
approach to that of the proposed mathematical model. As you
will see, the human and mathematical approaches are quite
different, as one would expect given the vastly different
resources each method uses . The focus of this chapter is
limited to the conceptual similarities and differences
between the two approaches. Chapter IV will focus more on
the mathematics and technical approaches.
A. THE STUDENTS' APPROACH
A definitive pattern developed in the students' approaches
toward most aspects of the FPIF contract. To determine the
target cost, all students did some type of averaging of the
competing proposals. Some groups averaged only the most
reliable proposals. Other groups averaged only the low-to-
mid range cost proposals. Still other groups averaged only
the most reliable proposals then adjusted the result. All
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groups used the independent cost estimate either as a check
and balance or as an additional proposal to calculate in the
average. To determine the target profit, the students
started with the historical data, then adjusted these rates
based on the specific risk elements of the ETC contract
.
Although the rates varied between 10-15%, each group
justified their rate with the historical data. To determine
the ceiling price, most students took a percentage of the
target costs. Although no group explained how they chose
their percentage, the percentages varied between 115-120% of
target cost. The point of total assumption was determined
from a mathematical formula based on the ceiling price.
Surprisingly, all groups determined the ceiling price first,
then used the ceiling price to determine the PTA. And
finally, there was no consensus on how to determine the
contractor share ratio. The share ratios varied
substantially among all groups, from 0.15 to 0.50. Some
groups chose different share ratios above and below the
target cost. Others just randomly selected a "middle" share
ratio, 0.25. A summary of the students' FPIF approaches is
shown in Table 3,1.
Some elements of the student thought process summarized in
Table 3.1 is not unlike business practices in contracting
offices today. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
26
Research, Development and Acquisition, the Honorable Gerald
A. Cann, recently published a memorandum regarding the
implementation of phased pricing. [Ref. 10 :p. 3] Phased
pricing is a contracting practice in which the buying office
establishes an option for initial production during an
engineering and manufacturing development contract . The
guidelines suggest a FPIS contract type, that may be modified
within parameters, and eventually will be solidified into a
FPIF contract. To determine a PTA, the guidelines suggest
that the PTA be within the range of 125%-135% of the target
cost. The phased pricing guidelines and the students'
approach are similar in that both use a percentage of target
cost to determine either the PTA or the ceiling price.
TABLE 3 . 1 STUDENT THOUGHT PROCESS IN DEVELOPING FPIF
FPIF Element Student Thought Process and Strategy
Target Cost some average of proposals
Target Profit adjusted, historical data
Ceiling Price some percentage of target cost
PTA mathematical formula, based on ceiling price
Share Ratio random
Source: Developed by researcher
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B. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL'S APPROACH
An overview of the computer model is shown in Figure 3.1.
This diagram flowcharts the structure and precedence of
procedures that the program executes to reach its results.
Both the mathematical model and the students ' approach have
many similarities, but also key differences. The
researcher's mathematical model, like the students', begins
by first determining a target cost. In competition the
target cost is based on the proposals of all contractors in
the competitive range. Those proposals deemed the most
reliable by the user are weighted more heavily than those
proposals deemed less reliable. Reliability is based on the
user's assessment of the accuracy of the contractor's cost
proposal. A company that bids relatively high for a contract
(even though it may have only a slim chance of winning the
award) might earn a high reliability factor if it (1) has a
history of submitting accurate proposals (2) has the capital
and personnel resources, and (3) has the required technical
ability for the contract . Based on the cost proposals and
the reliability assessment of the user, the model calculates
a weighted average, which will be used as the target cost.
The entire process is very similar to the students' approach
in the Electronic Testing Corporation case. Several
students, for example, averaged the most reliable contract
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Source: Developed by researcher
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proposals, then adjusted the result based on some subjective
analysis, to determine their target cost. The mathematical
model, similarly, uses data from all proposals in the
competitive range, but assigns more weight to the more
reliable proposals. Essentially, the two approaches are very
similar except that the students rely on limited analytical
data (only evaluating some of the proposals) plus subjective
analysis, whereas the model uses all of the proposals but
lacks subjective input.
Likewise, both the students' and mathematical model's
approach to determining the profit are similar. The model
determines the target profit based on historical data. The
model allows the user to input the target profit rate two
ways. First, the user can input a rate directly, such as
10% . Second, the computer can ask the user a battery of risk
questions and calculate a profit rate. The profit rate will
be within a preset range (determined by the user based on
industry standards) . If the user answers the questions that
suggest high risk, the profit rate will lean toward the upper
limit in the range. If the user's responses suggest low
risk, the profit rate will be toward the lower limit in the
range. The students, likewise, based their profit on their
assessment of risk—the greater the risk, the higher the
profit rates. For the target profit, overall, both the
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student and mathematical model approaches are very similar.
But this is where all similarities cease.
In the next step the model takes more than just a
procedural, but a philosophical difference to the student
approach. The model builds from three assumptions. (1) The
weighted average is the expected cost of the industry (2)
The Government is contracting with a "average" company in the
industry (3) the cost distribution within +/- 3 standard
deviations is uniform. The first assumption is based on the
market forces of competition. The collective results of
these proposals may be compiled to represent the cost curves
for the industry, if the industry is homogenous. The second
assumption is based on the Government's social-economic
programs. Generally, a buyer will tend to select the best,
or at least above average, supplier. However, unlike a
typical buyer, the Government often has secondary objectives.
These secondary objectives might be (1) to develop the
industrial base (second or dual sourcing) , or (2) to support
a social-economical program. As a result, this model assumes
the Government is negotiating with an "average" firm whose
cost curves are similar to that of the industry's. The third
assumption, as discussed in Chapter I, is chosen for its
computational ease.
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Diverging from the students' approach, next, the model
calculates the point of total assumption and the share ratio
simultaneously. The computer presents a seven option menu
that prompts the user to balance the contractor's risk. Five
of the seven options are called 'Normal Pricing' arrangements
(only one share ratio) . The other two options are called
'Special Pricing' arrangements (different share ratios above
and below target costs) . The model views these options as a
trade-off with no preference for any of the selections.
Unlike the students who are employing a subjective strategy
in their FPIF, the model prepares five basic options covering
a wide variety of share ratios and PTAs . Although each
option presents the user with a uniquely different FPIF, all
of the options have two key similarities. One similarity is
that the area under each of the FPIF curves is the same,
which means the expected profit for each curve is identical.
The second similarity is that, assuming a uniform cost
distribution, the expected cost to the Government for each
option is identical and equal to the sum of the target cost
plus the target profit . With this arrangement the model
attempts to accommodate the contractor based on her attitude
toward risk. If the contractor is risk aggressive, she will
tend to select the lower options which can offer high
rewards, but also heavy penalties for an over run. If the
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contractor is risk averse, she will tend to select the higher
options which do not offer high rewards, but neither heavy
penalties. If the contractor is risk neutral, she will not
care which option he selects since the expected profit for
each option is identical. Likewise, the Government is
indifferent since the expected cost to the Government is the
same for each option.
The basic five options, the heart of the model, ask the
user to balance the contractor's incentive to underrun
against the contractor's protection against an overrun. If
the user chooses to incentivize the contractor to underrun,
then the model will select a high contractor share ratio
(0.50), but a "strict" point of total assumption (+0.5
standard deviation from the target cost) . If the user
chooses to protect the contractor from an overrun, then the
model will select a low contractor share ratio (0.10), but a
"loose" point of total assumption (+2.5 standard deviations
from the target cost) . Obviously, there are several
intermediate options between these two extremes.
This approach differs substantially from the student
responses in four ways. First, the students' developed only
one FPIF curve, whereas the model presents five options to
the user. Second, to determine cost and profit rates, the
students focus on reasonableness, whereas the model
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concentrates on expected profit and expected cost to the
Government. Third, the students base the ceiling price on a
percentage of target costs, whereas the model bases the PTA
on standard deviations. Fourth, the students select share
ratio and PTA in two distinct steps, whereas the model
selects both simultaneously. Each of these differences is
analyzed in the following paragraphs.
While developing their FPIF curves, the students focused
on one arrangement only. Each group employed a uniquely
different strategy and weaved that strategy into their FPIF
curve. The model, on the other hand, attempts to take into
account the contractor's attitude toward risk. Based on the
contractor's attitude toward risk, the contractor can select
from different options. The students focused on their
objectives, whereas the model is much more accommodating to
the needs of the contractor.
Similarly, when analyzing costs and profit rates, the
students tend to assess their FPIF arrangement based on what
is reasonable. After selecting each of the unique
characteristics (target cost, profit, share ratio, ceiling
price) the students ensure that their arrangement is
reasonable and fits into their overall strategy. The model
makes no assessment of what is reasonable. Instead, it
focuses on the expected profit and expected cost to the
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Government. For each option, both the expected profit to the
contractor and the expected cost to the Government is the
same .
The student groups chose the ceiling price based on a
percentage of the target costs. This process works well for
people because of its mathematical simplicity. It is very
easy to calculate a percentage of another number. In the
Electronic Testing Corporation case, the students
subjectively assess the risk and can manipulate the ceiling
price. In this example, the students' responses varied from
115% to 120% of the target cost. The computer model, on the
other hand, does not have access to subjective or intuitive
information. Instead, it relies on its analytical abilities,
namely, rapid mathematical processing. Using the information
on the competitive proposals, the program calculates the
standard deviation. The point of total assumption is then
based on the standard deviation.
The fourth difference between the two approaches is the
number of steps used to determine the ceiling price and share
ratio. The human thought process used two distinct steps.
Again, this procedure is better suited for people because of
their abundance of subjective input. The students evaluated
risk at every decision point. Given a higher risk, the human
thought process might increase profit, extend the PTA and
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ceiling price, and evaluate a share ratio based on a
subjective strategy. The computer, on the other hand, must
be logical and procedural . This model evaluates risk only
when calculating the profit rate. When selecting a share
ratio and point of total assumption, the mathematical model
does not evaluate risk, but only attempts to balance risk.
The mathematical model offers the user a trade-off between
(1) a strong incentive to underrun and (2) protection against
an overrun. The user selects his choice from a menu. As he
chooses to increase the contractor's incentive to underrun
(higher contractor share ratio) , he automatically decreases
the contractor's protection against an overrun (lower PTA)
.
To conclude, Table 3.2 highlights the differences between
the human and computer approaches to developing a FPIF
arrangement. In some areas both the human and computer
approaches are very similar, while other areas are quite
different. Regardless of the differences, each method
attempts to capitalize on their relative strengths and
minimize their weaknesses to develop an effective pricing
arrangement, fair to both parties.
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TABLE 3.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUHAN AND COMPUTER APPROACH
FPIF Element Student Thought Process &. Strategy Computer / Mathematical Approach
Target Co3t 3ome average of proposals veighted average
Target Profit adjusted, historical data user input industry 3td3 / risk adjusted
Ceiling Price some percentage of target cost based on PTA
PTA math formula, based on ceiling price determined together based on
J-
std dev and risk trade-offs
* such that expected profit = constant
and expected co3t to govt = constant
Share Ratio random
Source: Developed by researcher
C . THE MODEL ' S APPROACH TOWARD A SOLE SOURCE
Finally, since all contracts are not competitive, the
researcher modified the program so that it can analyze sole
source contracts. For a sole source contract, the user must
input 5 probability costs. These are the 3%, 20%, 50%, 80%,
and 97% probability costs. The 20% probability cost, for
example, is that cost for which there is a 20% probability
that the contractor will complete the contract for this costs
or less. For the sole source contract, the target cost is
the 50% probability cost. Each of the remaining required
probability costs are based on standard deviations of a
normal distribution. For example, the 20% probability cost
is -1 standard deviation from the average. Likewise, the 3%
probability cost is approximately -2 standard deviations from
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the average. Having calculated the target cost, the model
proceeds as describe above by first determining the profit,
then balancing the share ratio and point of total assumption.
The following chapter describes in detail both the model's
competitive and sole source procedures by stepping through an
example and explaining the mathematical process at each step.
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IV. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL: A DETAILED ANALYSIS
This chapter focuses on the specific mathematics of the
model. The chapter is divided into sections that each
discuss the primary procedures of the computer program.
These sections are: Calculating the Target Cost, Calculating
the Target Profit, Determining the Share Ratio and Point of
Total Assumption, Calculating the Option Coefficients,
Analyzing the Expected Profit and Government Cost,
Understanding the Contractor's Utility, Using Statistics,
Analyzing Sole Source Contracts, and Summary. To explain the
mathematics, this chapter uses both examples and mathematical
derivations. The researcher assumes the reader is familiar
with the fundamentals of integral Calculus and Statistics.
A. CALCULATING THE TARGET COST
To calculate the target cost, the model requires the user
to first assess the reliability of all bottom-line cost
proposals and independent cost estimates, then enter these
data in order of most to least reliable into the program.
Those cost proposals/cost estimates deemed the most reliable
should be entered first . Those deemed less reliable should
be entered last. Those proposals outside the competitive
range, having no reasonable possibility of winning the award,
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should not be entered at all. This information will be used
to calculate a weighted average which eventually will be the
target cost
.
The primary reason the researcher decided to use this
prioritized system to calculate a weighted average as opposed
to a conventional grading system is to facilitate a user
friendly program. With a conventional grading system, the
user would have to input each cost proposal then assign a
numeric reliability factor to each proposal. These numbers
would be highly subjective and the additional qualitative
analysis that could be studied would not be that valuable.
The prioritized system, although sacrificing some qualitative
precision, facilitates a user friendly environment that does
not overload the user with cumbersome data entry
requirements
.
The most common procedure to calculate a weighted average
is for the user to assign a "weight" to each data point
compared against some standard. For example, if a woman is
going to invest in the stock market, she might assign a
weight to each possible investment opportunity. For
aggressive growth stocks, she might expect a 25% return; for
a balanced portfolio of stock she might expect a moderate 12%
return; and with a conservative portfolio in U.S. Government
Treasury Notes, she might expect an even lower yield of 8%.
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By selecting a mixture of these investment strategies, she
can calculate a weighted average based on the percentage she
invests in each category. Although this procedure for
calculating a weighted average is common, it is also tedious
and contrary to the manner in which many people make
decisions. Knowing the subjective nature of evaluating
competitive alternatives, few people want to assign weights
to their different options. Another approach to calculating
a weighted average is to prioritize a list from best to worst
based on some standard criteria. In this method, weights
would automatically be assigned based on each item's position
in the prioritized list. For example, assume the same woman
plans to invest capital in a wide variety of business
ventures. She subjectively forms a list in her mind, ranking
each investment opportunity from most to least risky. Her
list is as follows: high yield junk bonds; Latin America and
Pacific Rim industrial stocks; U.S. aggressive growth
stocks; short term high grade U.S. bonds; long term European
investment grade bonds; home mortgage loans; U.S. Treasury
Notes. By automatically weighting the riskier investments
heavier than the less risky investments, one can calculate a
weighted average through this prioritized list. The
advantage of this system is that it does not require the user
to assign weights for each investment. Instead, the user need
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only prioritize the list. The disadvantage of this system is
that it prevents the user from assigning a specific weight to
any one of the investments. As human beings, it is natural
for us to develop prioritized rankings. We rank everything
in our society from Fortune 500 companies to sports teams to
academic standings. Thus, to facilitate a user friendly
program, the researcher decided to use the prioritized method
rather than the grading method.
In the model, the user must prioritize all of the
competitive proposals from best to worst based on
reliability. The model uses this prioritized list to
determine a weighted average by assigning heavier weights to
the more reliable proposals based on the following equation:
EQUATION 4.1:
Wt Avg = n (1st) + (n-1) (2nd)+(n-2) (3rd)+ +(n-(n-l) ) (nth)
n+ (n-1) +(n-2) +(n-3) + + (n- (n-1)
)
n = total # of cost proposals/est in competitive range
1st = most reliable
2nd = second most reliable, etc.
Although this formula may seem extremely complex, in practice
it is relative simple. For example, let us examine a





$1,925,000 2nd most reliable
$1,950,000 3rd most reliable
$1,975,000 4th most reliable
$2,025,000 5th most reliable
From Equation 4.1 the model would weight the first cost
proposal five times heavier than the last. The second would
be weighted four times heavier than the last. The same
pattern would continue until all five proposals were
evaluated. Using the above formula, in this example the
weighted average would be:
(5) (2M)+(4) (1.925M)+13) (1.95M)+(2) (1.975M)+(1) (2.025M)
(5) + (4) + (3) + (2) + (l)





This weighted average serves as the initial target cost for
the model's FPIF arrangement. From this foundation, the
model builds. Later in the program, the user will be able to
fine tune these initial calculations according to any special
negotiation strategy.
B. CALCULATING THE TARGET PROFIT
After calculating the target cost, the next major building
block in the model is determining profit. For a FPIF
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contract, profit is a slanted line (Figure 2.1) that varies
based on the contractor's actual negotiated costs at
completion. The mathematical model uses target profit rate
(the profit rate at target cost) as the base for establishing
this profit line. There are two methods for the model to
determine a target profit rate. The first method, simply, is
for the user to directly input a rate such as 10%. In this
case, to determine the profit rate, the user should have
practical knowledge of similar contracts negotiated under
similar conditions. The second method is for the user to
input a range of industry standards for profit including the
maximum, minimum, and average profit rate for the industry.
The upper limit in this range would be the maximum profit for
a very high risk contract in the industry based on cost,
schedule, and performance. The lower limit, similarly, would
be the minimum profit for a very low risk contract.
Likewise, the average profit rate would be the baseline for a
contract with typical risk. The computer would then ask the
user a battery of risk questions, including the user's
assessment of technical, cost, and management risk. Based on
the user's responses, the computer would calculate a target
profit rate. If the responses indicate high risk, then the
calculated target profit rate will lean toward the upper
limit. Similarly, if the responses indicate low risk, then
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the profit rate will lean toward the lower limit. As
illustrated in the following example, the mathematics of this
procedure are relatively simple, yet the calculations can be
tedious, making it an ideal application for a computer. In
the battery of risk questions, the computer first instructs
the user to allocate risk of the contract among technical,
cost, and management. The sum of these three should total
100%. This risk allocation is similar to the Department of
Defense's Weighted Guidelines. [Ref. 4:part 215.971-2] For







Next the user will input his assessment of the technical,
management, and cost risk on a five point descriptive scale:
very high risk, above average risk, average risk, below
average risk, and very low risk. The computer provides the
user with background information for each of these risk types
and simple guidelines on evaluating risk in each category.
For example, in evaluating cost risk the user should consider
(at a minimum) the volatility of materials required, the
length of the contract, the extent and price of long lead
procurement items, the current state and volatility of
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inflation, the required training and time needed to train
personnel to work on the contract, the general labor/economic
conditions, and the amount of Government financing. After
the user has assessed risk for each of the three categories
(technical, management, cost), then the model calculates a
target profit rate based on the following equation:
EQUATION 4 .2
Target Profit Rate = T% (T RF ) + M% (MRF ) + C% (C RF )
T% = percentage of risk allocated to Technical
M% = percentage of risk allocated to Management
C% = percentage of risk allocated to Cost
T RF = Technical risk factor
MRF = Management risk factor
C RF = Cost risk factor
Equation 4.2 is relatively simple once one understands what
each variable represents. The risk percentages are based on
the user's initial allocation of risk among technical,
management, and cost. The risk factors are based on the
user's answers to the risk questions and the industry profit
standards . To determine the risk factor for each category,
very high risk is equated to the maximum profit . Above
average risk is equated to the mean between the maximum
profit and average profit . Average risk is equated to the
average profit . Below average risk is equated to the mean
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between the average and the minimum profit. And finally,
very low risk is equated to the minimum profit. Although
tedious, the mathematics are relatively simple. The best way
to explain the equation is to walk through a hypothetical





The maximum industry profit is 14%. The minimum industry
profit is 7%. And the average industry profit is 11%. The
user has assessed that the technical risk of the contract is
above average. The management risk of the contract is
average. And the cost risk of the contract is very low.
Then based on Equation 4.2, the target profit rate would be:
= 0.60 ( (14% + ll%)/2) + 0.20 (11%) + 0.20 (7%)
= 11.1%
With the computer model, the user need not be concerned about
all of these equations and variables. The model prompts the
user for specific information, and the user need only answer
the questions.
Now, the skeleton of an FPIF is beginning to form. The
model has determined two major elements of the FPIF
arrangement—target cost and the target profit rate. If one
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were to graph the arrangement with these limited data, it















Source: Developed by researcher FIGURE 4.1
C . THE SHARE RATIO AND POINT OF TOTAL ASSUMPTION
To determine the share ratio and the point of total
assumption, the model prompts the user to select from a menu
with seven options. The menu is divided into two major sub-
catagories : normal and special pricing arrangements. The
first five options, normal pricing, develop FPIF arrangements
with only one share ratio. The last two options, special
pricing, result in FPIF arrangements that have different
share ratios above and below target costs. Most of the
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discussion is limited to the five normal pricing
arrangements. Although the program represents the additional
options, the mathematical depth of these special pricing
options are quite limited, and should not be taken as a
serious part of the model. The heart of this model and the
discussion that follows is based only on the normal pricing
arrangements. The seven option menu presented to the user is
shown in Table 4.1.
The first five options, normal pricing arrangements, is
the focal point of the mathematical model. This menu gives
the user the option to balance the contractor's profit
incentive to underrun versus his protection against an
overrun. If the user decides to give the contractor a strong
incentive to underrun (high share ratio) he will also limit
the contractor's protection against an overrun (stricter
PTA)
.
This "trade-off" is analogous to the General
Accounting Office's study (discussed in Chapter II) that
found no correlation between share ratios and final costs.
The General Accounting Office concluded that the share ratio
was not a significant motivator to control cost, but a means
of balancing risk. By giving the user these options, he is
forced to "trade-off" or balance one benefit against another.
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TABLE 4.1: COMPUTER DISPLAY OF PRICING OPTIONS
Normal Pricing Arrangements:
1: pricing arrangement should give maximum profit incentive
for contractor to underrun cost in exchange for heavy
penalties for an overrun
2 : pricing arrangement should give strong profit incentive
for contractor to underrun cost in exchange for moderate
penalties for an overrun
3: pricing arrangement should give average profit incentive
for the contractor to underrun cost in exchange for some
protection against an overrun
4 : pricing arrangement should give small profit incentive for
the contractor to underrun cost in exchange for
substantial protection against an overrun
5: pricing arrangement should give minimal profit incentive
for the contractor to underrun cost in exchange for
maximum protection against an overrun
Special Pricing Arrangements:
6: pricing arrangement will have different share ratios above
& below target cost . The arrangement will give both a
strong profit incentive to underrun costs and strong
protection against an overrun
7 : pricing arrangement will have different share ratios above
& below target cost . The arrangement will give modest
profit incentive to underrun costs and limited protection
against an overrun
Source: Developed by researcher
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When the user selects an option from the basic five menu,
two values are assigned to the FPIF arrangement. First, the
user's entry sets the share ratio. Second, it determines the
point of total assumption in terms of standard deviations.
The first part of this simultaneous assignment is simple to
explain. If the user selects option 1, then the contractor
share will be the largest (0.50) . If the user selects option
2, then the contractor share will be 0.40. The pattern
continues, such that if the user selects option 5, then the
contractor share will be 0.10. The second part of this dual
assignment is more complicated. Unknown to the user, when the
model was determining the target cost, it was also
calculating a "modified" standard deviation of the
competitive cost proposals/estimates. The standard deviation
measures variation among data points. The textbook formula









n £ = the individual co3t proposals/estimates
average = weighted averaged from EQUATION 4.1
N = total numb er of propo3al3/e3timate3
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The model calculates a "modified" standard deviation
because instead of using the normal average, the model uses
the weighted average calculated in Equation 4.1. The results
are a slightly greater standard deviation. Although the net
effect of the modified calculation is minimal, the researcher
chose this approach to allow the model's standard deviation
calculation to capture some of the user's reliability
assessment
.
Having calculated the standard deviation, the model uses
this information to determine the point of total assumption.
If the user selects option 1, then the PTA is set at +0.5
standard deviation. Option 2 sets the PTA at +1.0 standard
deviations. Option 3 sets the PTA at +1.5 standard
deviations. Option 4 sets the PTA at +2.0 standard
deviations. And option 5 sets the PTA at +2.5 standard
deviations. Although not drawn to scale, Figure 4.2 shows
the trade-offs between options 1,3 & 5. Option 1 offers a
high profit if the contractor underruns, but also has the
least protection against an overrun. Option 5 is the exact
opposite
.
D . CALCULATING THE OPTION COEFFICIENTS
The researcher selected the different combinations of
share ratios and PTAs in order to cover a wide spectr\im of
options. The contractor's share ranges from 0.10 to 0.50,
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and the PTAs range from +0.5 to +2.5 standard deviations.
Each of these options were designed to force the user to
trade-off between an incentive to underrun versus protection
against an overrun. Next, the researcher had to develop a
means to ensure that each option was exactly balanced
mathematically. In this computation, the researcher assumed
that the subjective probability of the contractor's cost
distribution remains the same and is independent of the share
ratio and the PTA. This assumption must be modified if the
contractor can alter the cost distribution. To accomplish
this task, the research designed the coefficient options.
The coefficient options are coefficients assigned to each
option that slightly raise the target profit for that option,
such that the area under the FPIF curve for each of the
options is identical (Figure 4.2) . Notice that for each
option the FPIF curve passes slightly above the target profit
at the target cost. This difference (distant shown by the
arrows in Figure 4.2) is the coefficient for each option. In
this case, the distance between the arrows is the coefficient
for option 1. Each option has a different coefficient such
that the area under each curve within +/- 3 standard
deviations from the target cost is identical. The five
coefficients are: C : =0. 23958a; C 2 =0 . 20000a; C 3=0. 13125a;
C 4=0 . 066667a; C 5 =0 . 064583a, where a = the standard deviation.
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Source: Developed by researcher FIGURE 4.2
To derive each coefficient, we must find the function that
describes the FPIF curve, then integrate over +/- 3a. To
simplify the mathematics, we translate the y-axis to the
target cost, then derive the coefficient for each option.
The derivation for C 2 is shown in Equations 4.4 and 4.5.
EQUATION 4 .4
f(x) = -0.4x + C 2 when x<=PTA (la)
=
-x + C 2 + 0.6 when x> PTA (la)
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First, we describe the FPIF curve for option 2 which has a
share ratio of 0.4 and a PTA at la. Equation 4.4
mathematically represents this curve. Next, we integrate the
function over the 60 interval represented by Equation 4.5.
EQUATION 4 .5
CT 3a
\ (0. 4x + C
2
)dx + \(-x + C 2 +0.6a)dx = 6 aT
-3a a
where T^ = target profit
a = standard deviation
C- = coefficient for option 2
solving thi3 equation for C we find:
7C
•0. 2x* + C 2 x + "^x2 +
-3




-1. 2 a + 6C 2 » = 6 aT
C
2
= T^ + 0.2a
Thu3, the coefficient for option 2 is 0.20a
The function f(x) mathematically represents the FPIF
arrangement (Equation 4.4) . The FPIF arrangement can be
described as two lines, one when the actual cost (x) is less
than PTA, and another when the actual cost is greater than
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PTA. Below the PTA, the slope is -0.4 which corresponds to
the 0.4 share ratio for option 2. Above PTA, the contractor
bears all additional costs representing the -1.0 slope. To
solve for C 2 , we integrate over the effective range (+/- 3 a)
.
We equate the area under the FPIF curve to 60Tn , which is the
area of a rectangle with base 6<T (interval) times the height
Tn (target profit) . By applying the same mathematics to the
other options, we can find each of the five coefficients such
that the area under each curve is identical.
E . ANALYZING THE EXPECTED PROFIT AND GOVERNMENT COST
Equal area for each option is an important aspect of a
balanced trade-off. If the areas under each curve are equal,
assuming a uniform distribution, then the expected contractor
profit for each option is equal. The expected profit would
be the area under the curve divided by the interval which the
model defines as +/- 3 standard deviations. Since the area
under each curve is the same, and the interval is the same,
the expected profit for each option would be the same. 1
!. The mathematical derivation to calculate the expected
profit for the contractor is identical to the derivation
calculating the expected cost to the Government. Instead of
showing the derivation twice, the researcher will only show
the derivation for the expected cost to the Government.
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Next, we analyze the expected cost to the Government. The
expected cost to the Government is the sum of the actual
negotiated cost at contract completion plus the contractor's
profit. To calculate the expected cost, we need a
probability cost distribution function. The most realistic
probability cost distribution function would be a normal
distribution, however, as discussed in the first chapter, to
simplify the mathematics, we assume a uniform distribution.
A uniform distribution implies: (1) there is 100% probability
that the final negotiated cost will be within + /- 3a from the
target cost; and (2) within +/- 3a, each cost has an equal
probability of being the final negotiated cost (Figure 4.3)
.
Source: Developed by Researcher Figure 4.
3
To determine the expected Government cost, first we find the
function f (x) that represents the Government cost, then
integrate over the interval . The Government cost is the sum
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of the final negotiated cost plus the contractor's profit.
Below PTA, this cost increases as the actual costs increase
Once at PTA, the Government assumes no further
responsibility. Each additional cost is assumed by the
contractor. Thus, above PTA the cost to the Government is
the ceiling price. Graphically, this relationship is shown
in Figure 4.4.
Source: Developed by researcher Figure 4.
4
Figure 4.4 shows the Government cost curve transposed above a
FPIF curve. The FPIF curve initially has a negative slope
equal to the contractor's share ratio. Once the FPIF curve
reaches PTA, the slope equals negative one. The Government
cost curve initially has a positive slope equal to the
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Government's share ratio. Once the Government cost curve
reaches PTA, the curve remains flat, equal to the ceiling
price. Above PTA, every additional dollar is being paid by
the contractor. The Government cost curve shows that the
lower the actual costs, the lower the total cost to the
Government until PTA. Equation 4.6 mathematically describes




Govt Co3t = actual cost + profit
= x + s*TC + T - s*x + C .
7i opt f X<=PTA
= 3TC+T+C + (l-3)x
7C Opt
}
= CP + C
opt x>PTA
where
x = actual cost
s - contractor share ratio
TC = target cost
CP = ceiling price
C
opt = coefficient for the option selected
T^ = target profit
To calculate the expected, cost to the Government, one must
integrate the Government cost curve (Equation 4.6) over the
+/- 3<J interval. This relationship is shown in Equation 4.7
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EQUATION 4 .7
PTA TC + 3 a
Expected r . % _, 1 f
Govt Cost = ^ 3 ( ^ TC + T^ + C Qpt+
(l-s)x ) dx + _ ) (CP + C6ct
TC-3 CT PTA
Mathematically, with all of the symbols, it is difficult to
see exactly what is happening in Equation 4.7. Graphically,
the picture is much clearer. With a uniform distribution,
the expected Government cost (Equation 4.7) is the average of
the Government cost evaluated over the interval (+/- 3a) . In
Figure 4 . 4 the approximate expected Government cost is
designated by E (GC) near the arrow. In the model, since the
area under each of the FPIF curves for each option is equal
to 6GTn , the expected Government cost for all of the options
is also the same. Therefore, regardless of which option the
user selects, with a uniform distribution, the expected
Government cost for each option is a constant equal to (TC +
Tjj) . To show this relation mathematically, we must complete
the complicated integration in Equation 4.7, but a simpler
approach is to solve the problem graphically with geometry.
The integration in Equation 4.7 is nothing more then
computing the area of the Government cost curve, then
dividing the area by the interval. The Government cost curve
60
is Equation 4.6, which graphically looks like Figure 4.5.
The integral in Equation 4.7 is nothing more than the sum of
the two shaded regions in Figure 4.5. The area of the
rectangle on the right is (TC+3G-PTA) *CP . The area of the
trapezoid on the left is (f (TC-3C) +CP) /2 * (PTA- (TC-3G) )
,
where A = the x-intercept or sTC + T7l+C opt and f (TC-3G) is the
function f (x) evaluated at TC-3o.





Source: Developed by researcher Figure 4.
5
Next, if one programs these area formulas into a
spreadsheet, one can calculate the expected area for any
example. First the researcher programed a spreadsheet in
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accordance with these two area formulas
. Second, the
researcher entered some sample data as competitive proposals
into the computer model ($1000, $995, $980, $975, $1010, and
$1050) at 10% profit rate. The same data were entered for
each of the five options. The computer model calculated the
weighted average ($995) and the target profit ($100) as well
as the share ratio, PTA, and ceiling price for each of the
five options. Based on the computer results for each of the
five options, the researcher entered the data into a
spreadsheet program to graph the Government cost curves for
each option with the sample data. The five Government cost
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Source : Developed by researcher Figure 4.
6
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Next, with the spreadsheet program, the researcher calculated
the area under each curve over the 920 to 1075 interval, then
divided by the interval. The result for each curve was
identical, $1095. (Notice how each of the Government cost
curves also intersect at that point, $1095.) These results
confirm that the expected cost to the Government is E (GC) =
TC + T„ = $995 + $100 = $1095.
In summary, if we assume a uniform distribution, the model
presents the user with five options each with distinct
characteristics but an identical expected profit for the
contractor and an identical expected total cost to the
Government. The Government, therefore, should be indifferent
to the option that the contractor prefers. Furthermore, the
contractor should select that option which best matches her
attitude toward risk.
F. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTRACTOR'S UTILITY FUNCTION
No economic model would be complete without analyzing the
expected utility of these options for the contractor. Thus
far, the researcher has shown that both the expected profit
for the contractor and the expected cost to the Government
are constants for each option. But what about the utility
function for the contractor? A contractor's utility function
is based on his composite attitude toward risk and profit. A
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company may be risk averse, neutral, or aggressive. Although
most companies tend to be risk averse, the degree to which
these companies are risk averse may vary significantly.
The utility function of a company can be represented by
the following equation: U = Ka (Equation 4.8) [Ref 9:pp. 442-
445] If graphed, a utility function can take one of three
distinct possibilities, based on the value of a. If a<l,
then the utility function will be concave down. If a=l, the
utility function will be linear. And if a>l, then the
utility function will be concave up. Each of these three







Source: Developed by researcher Figure 4. 7
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The left graph, where a<l, implies that the contractor would
get more utility out of the first profits and less utility
from later profits. The center graph, where a=l, implies
that the contractor gets equal utility from each dollar she
earns. Finally, the right graph implies that the contractor
gets more utility from the last profits earned, than from the
initial profits
.
The objective of this mathematical analysis is to compare
the expected utility of the contractor for each of the five
options for each type of utility function. Based on the
contractor's utility function, will she tend to prefer one
option over the others? To analyze the contractor's
preference, one needs to start with the expected utility
function
.
The expected utility E (U) is defined by the integral of
the utility function evaluated over some interval. For the
five particular options in this analysis, the expected
utility is described in Equation 4.9. As before, the two
integrands represent the linear FPIF arrangement. The
interval remains the same (+/- 3a) as do the upper and lower
limits which are TC + 3CJ and TC-3CF respectively. However,
beyond these commonalities, each of the remaining variables
change based on the different options. As a result, it is
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very difficult to evaluate these integrals in respect to the
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H = higher limit a = utility exponent
L = lower limit A = 3TC + T^
"
= "~^ all other variables as before
An alternative approach is to look at the same example
studied earlier in this chapter. The researcher entered the
following competitive proposal data into the computer ($1000,
$995, $980, $975, $1010, $1050) . For each option, the
computer calculated the proposed FPIF pricing arrangement
including the share ratio, target cost, target profit, PTA,
and ceiling price. The researcher used the results from the
computer program in Equation 4.9, then entered the data into
a spreadsheet program to graph the expected contractor
utility for different values of a. (a=0.5, a=1.0, a=1.5).
In the first case, where a=0.5, the researcher found that the
expected utility increases as the user selects a higher
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option. This relationship is shown in Figure 4.8. In other
words, if the contractor is risk averse, she will get the









Expected Utility v Options (1-5)
when a= .
5
Source: Developed by researcher Figure 4.8
In the next case, where a=1.0, the researcher found that
the expected utility for the contractor remained relatively
constant (approximately 100 units) for different options as
shown in Figure 4.9. 2 This graph implies that if the
contractor is risk neutral, she will be indifferent as to
which option she selects. This idea corresponds to the fact
that for each option the expected profit to the contractor is
the same. If the expected profit is the same, and the
contractor is risk neutral, she should be indifferent to all
of the options.
2
. Figure 4.9 should be perfectly flat. The slight curve
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Source: Developed by researcher Figure 4.
9
Finally, in the third case, where a=1.5, the researcher
found that the expected utility for the contractor decreases
as the user selects a higher option. (Figure 4.10)
1050^ Expected Utility v Options (1-5)
vhen a= 1 .
5
Source: Developed by researcher Figure 4. 10
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In this case, the contractor is risk aggressive and would
prefer the lower options. The lower options have the highest
penalties for cost overruns, but also the greatest rewards
for underruns
.
In summary, this model presents the user with five
different options. For each of these options, the expected
profit for the contractor and the expected cost to the
Government are constants. However, contractors do not act
solely on the basis of expected profit . Contractors also
make decisions based on risk and utility. To maximize the
contractor's utility, if the contractor is risk averse, she
will tend to select the higher options . If the contractor is
risk aggressive, she will tend to select the lower options.
If the contractor is risk neutral, she will be indifferent as
to which option she selects
.
G. USING STATISTICS
Thus far, to simplify the mathematics, the researcher has
assumed a uniform distribution. At this point, it would be
valuable to shift gears and analyze some of the properties of
a normal distribution. In reality, the cost proposals will
tend to have a "normal" bell shape distribution. Assuming a
"normal" bell shape distribution, the standard deviation
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provides a wealth of statistical information. In a normal
distribution, one can assume that approximately 68% of the
contractors will fall within +/- 1 standard deviation, and
almost 95% within + /- 2 standard deviations. [Ref 15:p. 315]
Because this model bases the PTA on standard deviations, this
information can provide a wealth of statistical information.
One powerful aspect of a normal distribution is that it
allows the user to predict the distribution of cost
proposals. (Figure 4.11) From this graph, one can see that
only 3% of the proposals will fall above +2 standard
deviations. Approximately 14% of the proposals will fall
between +1 and + 2 standard deviations. And approximately 33%
will fall between the average and +1 standard deviation.
Since a normal distribution is symmetric about the average,
the same can be said about the negative standard deviations.
Source: Developed by researcher
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Figure 4. 11
With this information, assuming (1) a normal distribution;
(2) a typical company wins the award; (3) the cost proposals
are an accurate reflection of the actual costs; and (4) at
least four competitive proposals, then if the user selects,
for example, option 2 (which sets the PTA at +1 standard
deviation) there is approximately a 17% chance that the
actual cost will exceed the PTA (Figure 4.12) . Despite the
numerous assumptions made to reach this conclusion, these
data are valuable as a baseline estimate. The researcher
used this baseline information to develop the model. With
the same assumptions, for option 1 there is approximately a
30% chance that actual costs will exceed the PTA. For option
2, there is a 17% chance. For option 3 there is a 9% chance.
For option 4, there is a 3* chance. And finally, for option
5, there is approximately a 1% chance actual costs will
exceed the PTA. Obviously, from the above information one
can see that the lower the option, the greater the risk of
incurring costs in excess of the PTA. To balance this
additional risk, the lower options also have a higher
contractor share ratio. As stated before, for option 2 there









However, there is also a 17% chance that the actual costs
will be less than -1 standard deviation. Option 2 sets the
contractor share at 0.40 (relatively high) . If the
contractor underruns cost, with the higher share, she will
reap a larger profit. Thus, each option is a trade-off
between protection against an overrun and incentive to
underrun
.
H. ANALYZING SOLE SOURCE CASES
Finally, since competition is a luxury that the buyer
cannot always obtain, the researched wanted to modify the
model so that the user could use the program in a sole source
environment. Thus far we have only discussed the competitive
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part of the model. In the competitive model, the program
calculates a standard deviation for the industry using data
points from all proposals/cost estimates in the competitive
range. From these data, the model develops a FPIF pricing
arrangement targeted toward a typical or average firm in the
industry. If negotiating with an industry leader or poor
performer, the user can later fine tune the arrangement
toward that company's specific needs.
In the sole source arena, without cost proposals from
different companies, it is impossible to calculate a standard
deviation. Thus, instead, this half of the model attempts to
develop the cost curves for this one particular company only.
For the sole source part of the model, the user must input
the 3%, 20%, 50%, 80%, and 97% probability costs for this one
particular company only. Obviously, these costs will be
estimates and should be based on input from the contractor,
cost analyst, negotiator, and any other available source. In
theory, given the characteristics of a standard deviation,
each of these costs, assuming a normal cost distribution for
the company, should be evenly spaced one standard deviation
from the next. In other words, the difference between the
97% and 80% cost probability should be the same as the
difference between the 80% and 50% cost probabilities. The
chance that these costs will be exactly evenly spaced is
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remote. To compensate, the model calculates an average which
it uses as the standard deviation. Since the data from the
user may not translate to a normal curve, the researcher's
model "averages" the user's data then forces them into a
normal bell shape curve. The disadvantage of this process is
obvious: the data are skewed, although the net effect will
probably be minimal. The advantage of the process is
significant: it allows the user to make full use of a
"normal" distribution. This information allows the user to
make powerful predictions regarding the possible cost
distributions. For example, if the user input the following
probability data for a sole source contract:
differences
3% cost probability $1,110,000
20% cost probability $1,190,000 +$ 80,000
50% cost probability $1,250,000 +$ 60,000
80% cost probability $1,300,000 + $ 50,000
97% cost probability $1. 400.000 +$100.000
total $290,000
average $ 72, 500
With these data, by working backwards, the model can
calculate a standard deviation. Now this information can be
used exactly as if it were part of the competitive model.
The weighted average is the 50% cost probability. And the
standard deviation is $72,500. All of the remaining
characteristics of the FPIF arrangement are calculated the
same way as in the competitive model. Forcing the data into
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a normal curve gives the user the same statistical
information regarding probabilities of cost overruns as with
the competitive model. The only key difference is in the
competitive model. The program develops a FPIF arrangement
targeted toward a typical company in the industry. For sole
source cases, the model focuses on the cost curves of only
one particular company.
I . SUMMARY
In summary, to develop a FPIF arrangement, this model
starts by calculating the target cost and target profit.
Next, the model presents the user with five different FPIF
options. Each of these options represents a balanced trade-
off. At one extreme, the FPIF arrangement will have a high
contractor share (0.50), but a strict PTA (+0.5G). At the
other extreme, the FPIF arrangement will have a low
contractor share (0.10), but a loose PTA (+2. 5a).
Furthermore, by calculating coefficient options, each option
is balanced such that, for each option, both the expected
profit for the contractor is the same, and the expected cost
to the Government is the same.
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V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION, & FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSION
After analyzing the students' thought process for
developing FPIF contracts, the researcher concludes that the
unstructured human process relies significantly on personal
perceptions and judgment. To balance the human process, the
researcher's goal was to develop a mathematical FPIF model
that would approach the problem logically and systematically,
The model, designed to complement not replace the human
approach, has both similarities and differences from its
human counterpart. The researcher hopes that this initial
research may lead to the further development of mathematical
and computer models that will eventually become tools for
tomorrow's contracting officers. Using both the model's
systematic approach and the user's subjective analysis, the
researcher believes that the final result will be a superior
product than otherwise would have been developed.
The most significant difference in the model's approach
from the students ' approach is the concept of a balanced
trade-off. The model presents the user with different
options that each have the same expected profit for the
contractor and the same expected cost to the Government
.
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Then based on the contractor's attitude toward risk, she can
select the option that she prefers. This approach attempts
to (1) accommodate the contractor, (2) stabilize the expected
Government cost, and (3) be fair and reasonable.
The analysis of the contractor's expected profit and the
Government's expected cost is one of the major strengths of
this model. When studying the students' approach, the
researcher noted that no group analyzed either of these
factors. Although just an estimate, both of these estimates
help a contracting officer ensure that the arrangement is
fair and reasonable. The Government prides itself on its
ability to be fair and reasonable. Merely by signing his
name, a Government contracting officer implies that the
Government is paying a fair and reasonable price. However,
in this case, the students made no effort to mathematically
estimate either the expected profit for the contractor or the
expected cost to the Government
.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the researcher does not propose that this
mathematical model be immediately implemented in the
contracting community, there are certain properties that this
model incorporates that would be beneficial to contracting
officers. The researcher's recommendations are that the
contracting officer: (1) evaluate the expected cost to the
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Government; (2) accommodate the contractor by giving her
more flexibility in negotiating "balanced" trade-offs.
The researcher recommends that contracting officers, when
constructing a FPIF arrangement, should evaluate the expected
cost to the Government. The mathematical model, although
only an estimate, attempts to calculate the expected cost to
the Government. As protectors of the taxpayer's money, this
information is valuable because it ensures that the
Government is paying a fair and reasonable price. The
current practice only requires that the contracting officer
consider the target price. The target price is simply the
target cost plus the target profit . Although this represents
a "target" or objective, it is in no way related to the
expected cost to the Government. On the contrary, the
expected Government cost gives the contracting officer much
more information. This is the cost, based on all available
information, that the Government should expect to pay upon
contract completion.
The researcher's second recommendation is that, when
constructing a FPIF arrangement, the contracting officer
should consider, in addition to his own objectives, the
contractor's attitude toward risk. To accomplish this
recommendation requires a philosophical change in attitude.
For example, the contracting officer might provide more
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flexibility to the contractor regarding trade-offs among the
share ratio, PTA, and target profit as long as the expected
cost to the Government is the same.
C . FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
There are six areas of possible follow-on research that
would be valuable in developing potential software for
contracting officers. These areas span a wide variety of
expertise--f rom contracting to mathematics to computer
science. They include: (1) a comparison between the final
results and the processes of how contracting experts and the
researcher's mathematical model develop FPIF arrangements,
(2) a derivative model that balances contractor utility
rather than the expected cost to the Government, (3) an
upgraded model using a normal rather than a uniform
distribution, (4) the development of similar models for other
contract types, (5) an upgraded version of the researcher's
computer program, and (6) an advanced version of the model
that treats the cost probability density function parameters
as endogenous
.
1. Comparing Experts Against the Model
One means for this model to gain credibility is to
compare both the results and the processes of how contracting
experts and the mathematical model develop FPIF arrangements.
The researcher hopes that through further research this model
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can be tested against either current FPIF negotiating teams
or historical records of FPIF contracts. Furthermore, by
analyzing current FPIF practices, lesser developed areas of
the model could be updated. The researcher has devoted
significant time to studying the mathematics of balancing the
different options. This is the cornerstone of the model.
However, much less time has been devoted to ensuring an
accurate initial assessment of risk (i.e., the initial target
profit calculation)
.
2 . A Derivative Model
This mathematical model revolves around the concept
of balancing the different options. For each of the five
options, the expected cost to the Government is the same. As
such, the Government is indifferent to the option that the
contractor prefers. Another interesting approach would be to
balance the utility of the contractor for each option. To
balance the utility for different options, the researcher
would have to make an assumption regarding the contractor's
attitude toward risk. With this approach the contractor
would be indifferent to all of the options, and the
Government's objective would be to minimize cost.
3 . Using a Normal Distribution
To develop the current model, the researcher assumed a
uniform distribution to simplify the mathematics. Another
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area of possible follow-on research would be to analyze the
model using a normal distribution. Since a normal
distribution is more realistic to cost estimation, the
results of this research would be more precise.
4. Models For Other Contract Types
Another logical follow-on research topic would be to
develop similar models for other contract types. The other
incentive contracts, in particular, would be strong
candidates for mathematical models. A FPIF mathematical
model by itself would be relatively useless to the
contracting community given how infrequent FPIF contracts are
used. However, a collection of computer models, representing
a wide variety of contract types, would be an asset to
contracting personnel
.
5. Upgrading the Computer Program
Another potential follow-on research idea addressed
in this thesis would be to take the current computer program
and upgrade it to commercial software. Although the current
version of the software is usable, it is far from being a
polished commercial product . Regardless of the power of a
program, if it is not accessible to users it has no value at
all. One initial goal of the researcher was to develop a
mathematical model that would assist contracting personnel
throughout the field. An important step in getting the model
out to the field is the development of commercial software
that can be used, studied, and analyzed by field personnel.
Although not directly an acquisition or contracting issue,
this research might be a potential joint effort between a
management and computer science study.
6. Changing Cost Probability Density Functions
In this model the researcher assumed that the
contractor's probability of cost distribution was independent
of the share ratio and PTA. If there are only minor changes
in the share ratio and PTA, this is a valid assumption.
However, given larger changes in the share ratio and PTA, the
contractor's probability of cost distribution will change. A
thesis for possible follow-on research might be to upgrade
this model such that as the share ratios and PTAs change, the
contractor's probability cost distribution also changes.
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Programmer: Terry N. Toy }
Naval Postgraduate School }
Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm Computer Analysis Program }
Thesis Project: MacPascal Application }
This program develops potential FPIF pricing arrangements. }
The user should set the profit percentiles based on the industry }
standards for FPIF type contracts. The high profit should }
represent a fair profit rate the contractor should earn if he/she }
undertakes the maximum risk for this type of contract. Likewise, }
the average profit and low profit rates should represent a fair }
profit rate if the contractor has average or low risk given this }
type of contract. The user can adjust these constants below: }
var
count : integer;






cost : array[-4..6] of real;
profit : array[-4..6] of real;
KTRratio : real;
CV, CP, PTA : real;
Pcost : array[1..5] of real;
c1, c2, c3, c4, c5 : real;
{number of BAFOs and IGCEs}
{array of BAFOs and IGCEs}
{sum of all BAFOs and IGCEs}
{profit % at target cost}
{Std Dev of BAFOs and IGCEs}
{Average of all BAFOs and IGCEs}
{Target profit}
{cost array incremented by half STD}
{profit array based on STD}
{Contractor share ratio}
{Co Variance, Ceiling Price, PTA}
{Probability Costs 3,20,50,80,97%}
{coefficients for options}
{various risk mgmt user input assessments to calc profit rate }
cost_risk, tech_risk, mgmt_risk, check_sum : real;
risk_menu_1, risk_menu_2, risk_menu_3 : integer;




temp, temp_STD1, temp_STD2, temp_STD3, temp_STD4, temp_STD5,
temp_STD6 : real;
continue, main_continue, Alarm, adequate_competition : boolean;
dummy_key : char;
choicel
, choice2, continue_menu, competition_choice : integer;
i, fine_tune_menu, profit_menu_1 : integer;
temp_count, denum, main_menu_continue : integer;
select_count1 , select_count2 : integer;
temp_AVG_BAFO, temp_target_profit, temp_profit_ratio : real;
underKTRratio, overKTRratio : real;
high_profit, avg_profit, low_profit : real;
{ INTRODUCTION prints out the basic user information and }
{ background to the software application. Included are the }




writeln(' * * * * FP I F computer Aided Analysis ****•);
writeln
;
writelnfThis program is designed to assist contracting personnel analyze &
develop potential pricing arrangements for FPIF type contracts. With
this software
,
personnel can ask "what if "questions and quickly
adjust FPIF arrangements . ');
writeln;
writeln(The computer program requires the following information:');
writelnf extensive cost data');
writelnf all profit guidelines ');
writelnf answers to various questions to develop pricing strategy');
writeln;
writelnfAs with all computer applications, this program requires accurate
information in order to develop a viable FPIF arrangement. Without




writelnfFurthermore, the more information (more BAFOs/IGCEs/profit
data/ cost probabilities) the better the results. Any computer results
derrived from limited information should not be the primary means of
evaluating the pricing arrangement ');
writeln
;
writeln('For more detailed information, consult the user manual');
writeln
;







{ INITIALIZE sets all variables to zero. This procedure is called }
{ at the beginning of the program and when the user resets the }










































while continue = true do
begin
writeln;
writeln('This program takes two different approachs to developing a
pricing structure based on the availability of or lack of adequate
contractor competition.');
writeln('lf there is not adequate competition, then this program requires
additional cost data to determine the cost risk and variances. ');
writeln;
writeln('GENERAL RULE: Four or more competitive proposals is adequate
competition. One proposal (sole source) is limited competition. If
you have two or three competitive proposals, you may want to do
both a limited & adequate competition analysis. ');
writeln;
writeln(' Please enter the correct number from the below menu: ');
writeln;
writeln('1: Adequate Competition');
write('2: Limited Competition. ');
readln(Competition_choice);
















{ GET_BAFOS prompts the user to input all BAFO and IGCE cost data }
{ Data is entered and stored in an array of real numbers. Maximun }





writeln(This computer application requires the user to rank all the
BAFOs/IGCEs in order from most to least reliable cost proposals. In
other words, the first BAFO/IGCE entered should be the users opinion
of the company ');
writeln('with the most realistic cost proposal based on that companys
historical "reliablility" records, capital and labor assets, concurrent
contract work, and any other important factor deemed by the user to
affect reliability.');
writelnfLikewise, the last BAFO / IGCE entered should be the least reliable
cost proposal as evaluated by the user. ');
writeln
;
writeln('Remember, the better and more complete the input data, the better
the output data. Any offers from companies that the user determines
to be outside the competive range, should be considered invalid data
and not entered into the computer.');
writeln;
writelnfEnter BAFOs/IGCEs now. After each entry press "return".');






while temp <> -1 do
begin













writelnfWith limited competition, it is difficult to gain a good perspective
of potential cost variances. This program requires the user to input
the 3%, 20%, 50%, 80%, and 97% estimated cost probabilities.');
writeln;





and other sources . ');
writeln;
writeln('DEFINITION: The XX% probability cost is the estimated cost for
which there is a XX% probability that the contractor will be able to
complete the contract for this cost or less . ');
writeln;
writeln('Another way to look at this data is as follows: The 3% probability
cost is the cost that the contractor will incur if almost EVERYTHING
goes perfectly.');
writeln('Likewise, the 50% probability cost is the approximate cost that
the contractor will bear assuming everything goes as expected. The
97% prob cost is the cost that the contractor will incur if virtually
EVERYTHING that can go wrong, does go wrong ');
writeln;
writeln('NOTE: costs should increase as the probabilities increase. In other
words, the 97% probability cost should be the largest, and the 3%
probability should be the lowest. ');
writeln;
continue := true;
while continue = true do
begin
















if (Pcost[1] < Pcost[2]) and (Pcost[2] < Pcost[3]) and (Pcost[3] < Pcost[4])





writeln('*** You have made an error ***');
writeln('Please try again. Your costs must increase as the






{ GET_PROFIT allows the user to input a profit rate directly or }
{ presents the user with a battery of risk assessment question }
{ to calculate a profit rate with the computer. This rate can be }
{ fined tuned later in the main program to user's desires. }





writeln('An effective FPIF pricing structure requires a fair and reasonable
profit rate. This program allows the user to directly input a target
profit rate. This rate should be based on Weighted Guidelines or
historical stds.');
writelnflf the user does not have a WGL profit calculation or reliable
historical data, this program will calculate a profit rate based on the
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the users assessment of the contract risk conditions . ');
writeln;
writeln('Please select from the following menu:');
writeln
;
writeln('1: User will enter profit rate into the computer directly.');
write('2: User would like the software application to develop initial profit
percentage based on the users answers to specific risk assessment





if profit_menu_1 = 1 then
begin
continue := true;
while continue = true do
begin
write('Please enter the target profit rate. Be sure you enter the rate
as a decimal. For example 10% profit should be entered as 0.10 a
');
readln(profit_ratio);
if profit_ratio <= 1 then
continue := false
else
writelnfYour select did not make sense. Please re-enter your profit





writeln(To calculate a fair and reasonable profit rate, the computer
model needs to know the industry standards for profit.');
writeln;
writeln('You will be required to enter three profit rates based on
industry standards. These rates are: (1) maximum profit rate (2)
average profit rate (3) low profit rate. The high profit rate is
that rate within the industry');
writeln('that a contractor would expect to earn given a high risk
performance contract with a strict schedule. The average profit
rate is that rate usually earned for a standard or average workload.
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And the low profit rate');
writeln('is that rate a contractor would earn given a very low risk
contract . ');
writeln;
write('ln decimal form, input the maximum profit rate ');
readln(high_profit);
write('ln decimal form, input the average profit rate ');
readln(avg_profit);
write('ln decimal form, input the low profit rate ');
readln(low_profit);
writeln;
writeln(This program computes a profit percentage based on the users
assessment of the required risk management . The software takes
into consideration three types of risk : Technical
,
Management and
Cost Control . ');
writeln;
writeln('lnput your evaluation of the areas of risk by assigning a
percentage for each of the three risk types. Your total percentage
should equal 1.00. The greater the percentage, the greater the risk
in that particular area ');
writeln;
writeln('For example, a contract that uses advance technology will have
a relatively high technical weight. A contract that requires
extensive coordination or a strict delivery schedule will have a
relatively high mgmt weight');
writeln('Similarly, a contract that requires high initial start-up capital
or requires a substantial quanity of materials with volitile prices
should have a relatively high cost risk weighting.');
writeln;
writeln('Enter your risk assessments in the following format.
Remember, the three weightings should total 1.00 . ');
writeln;
writeln(Technical Risk: 0.30 ', ' Technical Risk: 0.50');
writelnfManagement Risk: 0.50', ' Management Risk: 0.25');
writelnf'Cost Control Risk: 0.20', ' Cost Control Risk : 0.25 ');
writeln;
continue := true;

















check_sum := tech_risk + mgmt_risk + cost_risk;
if check_sum = 1 then
continue := false
else
writeln('Your assigned risk inputs did not total 1.00. Please input
these risk weighting again.');
end;
continue := true;








writeln('Some factors that should influence your technical risk
assessment include: use of state of the art technology, relative
degree of percision and tolerances, complexity of product or
service, level and experience of engineering staff. ');
writeln;
writelnf 1: high technical risk ');
writeln(' 2: above average technical risk ');
writeln(' 3: average technical risk ');
writeln(" 4: below average technical risk ');
write(' 5: low technical risk ');
readln(risk_menu_1);
if (risk_menu_1 > 0) and (risk_menu_1 < 6) then
continue := false
else






while continue = true do
begin




writeln('Some factors that should influence your management risk
assessment include: relative degree of inter-division or
subcontracting coordination, strict schedule requirements
,
level
and experience of management support and oversight. ');
writeln;
writelnf 1: high management risk ');
writelnf 2: above average mangement risk ');
writeln(' 3: average management risk ');
writeln(' 4: below average management risk ');
write(' 5: low management risk ');
readln(risk_menu_2);
if (risk_menu_2 > 0) and (risk_menu_2 < 6) then
continue := false
else














writeln('Some factors that should influence your cost risk assessment
include: volitility in price of materials, amount of required start
up capital as percentage of total contract
,
government financing
through progress payments, length of contract. ');
writeln;
writeln(' 1: high cost control risk ');
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writeln(' 2: above average cost control risk ');
writelnf 3: average cost control risk ');
writeln(' 4: below average cost control risk ');
write(' 5: low cost control risk ');
readln(risk_menu_3);
if (risk_menu_3 > 0) and (risk_menu_3 < 6) then
continue := false
else





{ These risk weightings can be adjusted to different values }










































profit_ratio := ((tech_risk_value * tech_risk) + (mgmt_risk_value *
mgmt_risk) + (cost_risk_value * cost_risk))
end;
end;
{ BASIC CALC computes the Standard Deviation, average weighted }
{ BAFO/IGCEs, target profit (profit at Target Cost), and Co Variance.}
{ The average weighted BAFO assigns a heavier weighting to the higher }








for i := 1 to count do
begin
BAFOJotal := BAFO[i] * temp_count + BAFOJotal;
denum := denum + temp_count;
temp_count := temp_count - 1
;
end;
AVG_BAFO := BAFOJotal / denum;
for i := 1 to count do
begin
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BAFOjotal := BAFO[i] + BAFOjotal;
end;
STDsum := 0;
for i := 1 to count do
begin
STDsum := STDsum + (AVG_BAFO - BAFO[i]) * (AVG_BAFO - BAFO[i]);
end;
STDsum := STDsum / count;
STD := sqrt(STDsum);
target_profit := AVG_BAFO * profit_ratio;



















STD := (temp_STD1 + temp_STD2 + temp_STD3 + temp_STD4 + temp_STD5
temp_STD6) / 6;
target_profit := AVG_BAFO * profit_ratio;
end;
CALC_PROFIT_STRUCTURE assigns a profit value for each element }
in the profit array. Target profit is the first value assigned to the }
target cost. Thereafter, profit is increased or decreased as cost }
moves farther from Target Cost according to the contractor share }






d := 0.239583 * STD;
c2 := 0.2 * STD;
c3 := 0.35625 * STD;
c4 := 0.066666 * STD;
c5 := 0.0645833 * STD;
if choicel = 1 then
begin
profit[-4] := target_profit + d + KTRratio * r\ * STD;
profit[-3] := target_profit + d + KTRratio * 1.5 * STD;
profit[-2] := target_profit + d + KTRratio * 1 * STD;
profit[-1] := target_profit + d + KTRratio * 0.5 * STD;
profit[0] := target_profit + d;
profit[1] := target_profit + d - KTRratio * 0.5 * STD;
profit[2] := profit[1] - 0.5
k STD
profit[3] : = profit[2] - 0.5 k STD
profit[4] : = profit[3] - 0.5 k STD
profit[5] := profit[4] - 0.5 " STD
profit[6] := profit[5] - 0.5 * STD
PTA := cost[1];
CP := PTA + profit[1];
end;
if choicel = 2 then
begin
profit[-4] := target_profit + p2 + KTRratio * r\ * STD;
profit[-3] := target_profit + c2 + KTRratio * 1.5 * STD;
profit[-2] := target_profit + c2 + KTRratio k * * STD;
profit[-1] := target_profit + c2 + KTRratio * 0.5 * STD;
profit[0] := target_profit + c2;
profit[1] := target_profit + c2 - KTRratio * 0.5 * STD;
profit[2] := target_profit + c2 - KTRratio * 1 * !STD;
profit[3] : = profit[2] - 0.5 '* STD
profit[4] : = profit[3] - 0.5 ' fc STD
profit[5] : = profit[4] - 0.5 ' fc STD
profit[6] := profitp] - 0.5 'v STD
PTA := c ost[2];
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= target_profit + c3 + KTRratio
= target_profit + c3 + KTRratio
= target_profit + c3 + KTRratio
= target_profit + c3 + KTRratio
= target_profit + c3;
= target_profit + c3 - KTRratio '
= target_profit + c3 - KTRratio '
= target_profit + c3 - KTRratio '
= profit[3] - 0.5 * STD
= profit[4] - 0.5 * STD
= profit[5] - 0.5 * STD
PTA := cost[3];





















































[0] := target_profit c4;
1] := target_profit + c4 - KTRratio
2] := target_profit + c4 - KTRratio
3] := target_profit + c4 - KTRratio
4] := target_profit + c4 - KTRratio
5] := profit[4] - 0.5 * STD;
[6] := profit[5] - 0.5 * STD;
PTA := cost[4];




















if choicel = 5 then
begin
profit[-4] := target_profit + c5 + KTRratio * 2 *

























:= target_profit + c5 + KTRratio
:= target_profit + c5 + KTRratio
= target_profit + c5;
= target_profit + c5 - KTRratio '
= target_profit + c5 - KTRratio '
= target_profit + c5 - KTRratio '
= target_profit + c5 - KTRratio '
= target_profit + c5 - KTRratio :




















































= target_profit - overKTRratio
= profit[4] - 0.5 * STD;
= profit[5] - 0.5 * STD;
PTA := cost[4];









































:= target_profit + underKTRratio * 2 * STD;
:= target_profit + underKTRratio * 1.5 * STD;
:= target_profit + underKTRratio * 1 * STD;
:= target_profit + underKTRratio * 0.5 * STD;
:= target_profit;
= target_profit - overKTRratio * 0.5 * STD;
= target_profit - overKTRratio * 1 * STD;
= profit[2] - 0.5 * STD;
= profit[3] - 0.5 * STD;
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writeln(' 2 : pricing arrangement should give strong profit incentive for
contractor to under run cost in exchange for moderate penalties for
an over run ');
writelnf 3 : pricing arrangement should give average profit incentive for
contractor to under run cost in exchange for some protection
against an over run ');
writeln(' 4 : pricing arrangement should give a small profit incentive for
contractor to under run cost in exchange for substanial protection
against an over run ');
writeln(' 5 : pricing arrangement should give minimal profit incentive for
contractor to under run cost in exchange for maximum protection
against an over run ');
writeln(' SPECIAL Pricing Arrangements ');
writeln(' 6 : pricing arrangement will have different share ratios above &
below target cost. The arrangement will give both a strong profit
incentive to under run costs and a strong protection against an over
run. ');
write(' 7 : pricing arrangement will have different share ratios above &
below target cost. The arrangement will give modest profit




if (choicel > 0) and (choicel < 8) then
continue := false
else









if choicel = 1 then
KTRratio := 0.5;
if choicel = 2 then
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KTRratio := 0.4;
if choicel = 3 then
KTRratio := 0.3;
if choicel = 4 then
KTRratio := 0.2;
if choicel = 5 then
KTRratio := 0.1;
















writelnf Target Cost is ', temp_AVG_BAFO : 10 : 3);
writelnC Target Profit % is ', temp_profit_ratio : 10 : 3);
writelnf Target Profit is ', temp_target_profit : 10 : 3);








writelnf Target Cost is ', AVG_BAFO : 10 : 3);
writelnf Target Profit is ', profit[0] : 10 : 3);
if KTRratio <> then
writelnf Contractor Share Ratio is ', KTRratio : 10 : 3)
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else
writeln(' Contractor Share Ratio above/below target cost is \








for i := -4 to 6 d o
begin
writeln(' cost ', cost[i] : 10 : 3, ' profit ', profit[i] : 10 : 3);
end;
writeln;
writelnf Point of Total Assuption is ', PTA : 10 : 3);




















while continue = true do
begin
writeln(' **** Select from the below menu to continue **** ');
writeln;
writelnf 1: reset program and begin with new BAFOs & IGCEs');
writelnf 2: revise profit analysis ');
writelnf 3: revise incentive structure analysis');
writelnf 4: fine tune the existing pricing structure');
write(' 5: exit to main menu ');
readln(continue_menu);































writeln('You have selected option 4, which allows the user to fine
tune the existing pricing structure. This option will make
minor adjustments in the pricing arrangement. Select the
appropriate number based on the below menu.');
writeln
;
writeln(' NOTE: If you have selected a SPECIAL Pricing




writeln(' 1 : profit is too high; reduce profit. ');
writelnf 2: profit is too low; increase profit. ');
writeln(' 3: contractor share ratio is too high; reduce share
ratio.');
writeln(' 4: contractor share ratio is too low; increase share
ratio. ');
writeln(' 5: keep same pricing structure, but lower the target cost
');
write(' 6: keep same pricing structure, but raise the target cost
readln(fine_tune_menu);
if fine_tune_menu = 1 then
begin






if fine_tune_menu = 2 then
begin







if (fine_tune_menu = 3) and (Alarm = false) then
begin





if (fine_tune_menu = 4) and (Alarm = false) then
begin





if (fine_tune_menu = 5) and (Alarm = false) then
begin
select_count1 := select_count1 + 1
;
temp_AVG_BAFO := AVG_BAFO - 0.5 * STD * (select_count1 -
select_count2);
temp_target_profit > target_profit + 0.5 * STD * KTRratio *
(select_count1 - select_count2);




if (fine_tune_menu = 6) and (Alarm = false) then
begin
select_count2 := select_count2 + 1
temp_AVG_BAFO := AVG_BAFO + 0.5 * STD * (select_count2 -
select_count1);
temp_target_profit := target_profit - 0.5 * STD * KTRratio *
(select_count2 - select_count1);










writeln(' You have selected a SPECIAL Pricing Arrangement.







































while continue = true do
begin
writeln(' **** Select from the below menu to continue **** ');
writeln;
writeln(' 1: reset program and begin with new cost probabilities');
writelnf 2: revise profit analysis ');
writelnf 3: revise incentive structure analysis');
writelnf 4: fine tune the existing pricing structure');
writef 5: exit to main menu ');
readln(continue_menu);






























writeln('You have selected option 4, which allows the user to fine
tune the existing pricing structure. This option will make
minor adjustments in the pricing arrangement. Select the
appropriate number based on the below menu.');
writeln
;
writeln(' NOTE: If you have selected a SPECIAL Pricing
Arrangement, you will not be able to select fine tune options
3-6');
writeln;
writelnf 1 : profit is too high; reduce profit. ');
writelnf 2: profit is too low; increase profit. ');
writelnf 3: contractor share ratio is too high; reduce share
ratio.');
writeln(' 4: contractor share ratio is too low; increase share
ratio. ');
writelnf 5: keep same pricing structure, but lower the target cost
');
write(' 6: keep same pricing structure, but raise the target cost
');
readln(fine_tune_menu);
jf fine_tune_menu = 1 then
begin






if fine_tune_menu = 2 then
begin
in






jf (fine_tune_menu = 3) and (Alarm = false) then
begin





if (fine_tune_menu = 4) and (Alarm = false) then
begin





if (fine_tune_menu = 5) and (Alarm = false) then
begin
select_count1 := select_count1 + 1
;
temp_AVG_BAFO := AVG_BAFO - 0.5 * STD * (select_count1 -
select_count2);
temp_target_profit := target_profit + 0.5 * STD * KTRratio *
(select_count1 - select_count2);




if (fine_tune_menu = 6) and (Alarm = false) then
begin
select_count2 := select_count2 + 1
temp_AVG_BAFO := AVG_BAFO + 0.5 * STD * (select_count2 -
select_count1);
temp_target_profit := target_profit - 0.5 * STD * KTRratio *
(select_count2 - select_count1);









writeln(' You have selected a SPECIAL Pricing Arrangement.
This application cannot process your request.');
writeln;
end;
if (fine_tune_menu < 1) or (fine_tune_menu > 6) then
begin
writeln;























writeln('Please select a number from the following menu:');
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writeln('1: exit program');
















Electronic Testing Corporation Case Study
NOTE:;. The answers typed in for this case represent




Electrical Testing Incorporated Case
Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm Contract Type
You are a senior contracting officer employed by
Electrical Testing Corporation (ETC) a high tech company with
over 50 service facilities throughout the world. ETC is a
company that provides advance electronic testing to computer
and electronic manufacturers throughout the world. Since the
early 1980s, when high technology manufactures learned that
finding a detect in electronic components before assembly is
significantly less expensive that finding the detect after
assembly, the electronic testing service market has grown by
almost 1000%.
As one of the more experienced contracting officers, you
have been assigned to work on the XYZ acquisition project—an
advance machine that will greatly enhance the productivity at
ETC. Your company's technical staff has described the machine
as "an advance technological accomplishment that will
required high level engineering support to ensure its proper
construction." The XYZ will be a modern electronic apparatus
capable of testing a wide variety of advance electronic and
computer chips . ETC is planning to purchase five XYZ
machines. If the machine proves as successful as predicted,
ETC will expand production and purchase ten more machines
each year for the next five years. These machines will
replace current testing machines at ETC testing centers
throughout the world.
Your supervisor has recently informed you that your major
competition is also planning a similar expansion into this
high tech market . Since your company is committed to being
the first to offer this service, your contract
specifications for the initial five XYZ machines require a
strict delivery schedule (12 months) . Normally, a project of
this magnitude would required at least 14 months. However, a
12 month delivery schedule is not unrealistic or unreasonable
if given adequate contractor management attention.
You recently issued a Request for Quotation to seven
companies (Company A - Company G) that you think may be
qualified to build the XYZ machine. All seven companies
replied. Your acquisition team met with each of these
companies. They are satisfied that each of these companies
can build the XYZ machine in accordance with the
specifications except for Company G. Your team has
determined that Company G, given the 12 month delivery
schedule, cannot build the XYZ machine on time, because of
its current lack of key materials, personnel, and experience.
In addition, you have also assigned some of your cost
analysts to prepare an independent cost estimate. The bottom
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line of the cost analyst report and the contractors'
proposals are shown in Exhibit 1 with your "reliability"
assessment of each document
.
One of your primary concerns is developing an incentive for
the contractor to control costs. Based on the risk and your
acquisition strategy, you are planning to use a FPIF type
contract. One aspect of developing an effective incentive
pricing structure is determining a fair and reasonable profit
rate. To determine a fair rate, you researched company files
and all published data for similar purchases with FPIF
contracts . You found four similar cases that were awarded
within the last three years . The target profit rates (profit
rate at target cost) in these purchases ranged between 9-
10.5%. However, these cases did not require an accelerated
delivery schedule. You have also noted that in three out of
four of these cases, the actual costs ran slightly over the
target costs. In the fourth case, the actual costs were
substantially lower than target costs, and the contractor
earned a healthy profit . Although this information is
valuable as a guide, you realize that this data cannot be
compared directly to your acquisition, given the variety of
negotiation positions and/or strategies in any one contract.
From your experience, you have noticed that high tech
companies tend to perform well on contracts in which there is
an incentive for high financial reward. Based on this
observation, you have recommended that ETC use an FPIF
arrangement that will offer a high profit to the contractor
if he/she under runs. However, you are also aware of your
company's current budget restraints. Due to the prolonged
1991-1992 recession, the silicon chip business has been
temporarily stalled. Your company's top management has
adopted a strict policy to review all large expenditures and
evaluate the decision and rationale for the expense. You are
concern that if the contractor for the XYZ machine earns an
unjustified high profit, your contract will get an
unfavorable review by top management, and your reputation in
the company will be tarnished.
Your supervisor, the Director of Contracts, recently met
with you and said, "Implement your plan as you see fit." He
has great confidence in you and your abilities. His only
recommendation was to award the contract as soon as possible.
"We need to have this machine up and running before our
competitors get it."
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(Figures represent cost of building the XYZ machines IAW the
specifications. These figures are cost only, and do not
include profit.)
* Reliability Assessment is a ranking the cost analyst put on
each proposal based on the proposal's accuracy, information
in the proposal, the contractor's performance record, and
current market conditions. Possible assessment categories
are very high, high, good, fair, and poor.
Questions
:
1. On the graph paper provided, develop an initial, generic
FPIF pricing arrangement for this case. Include your Ceiling
Price, contractor share ratio, PTA, Target Cost, and Target
Profit. (These can be estimates from your graph.)
How did you determine your target costs?
a. Averaged more reliable proposals— then rounded
b. Used independent estimate as check and balance
How did you determine your target profit?
a. Used historical records of past profit rates
b. Adjusted for higher risk in this contract
How did you determine your point of total assumption?
a. Used mathematical formula based on ceiling price,
share ratio, and target price
How did you determine your Ceiling Price?
a. Based on a percentage of target cost
How did you determine your share ratio?
a. Based on personal strategy




What factors led you to your strategy? What thought
process did you follow? If possible, list (or flowchart) the




Use competition to determine target cost. Be reasonable
b Analyze risk and historical records.
c> E \aluate the overall arrangement. Ensure arrangement is
reasonable
.
8. Do you think this is a realistic case? Were there any
key facts, conditions, considerations that were not in the
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